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On March 23, 1983, more than seven years after the Indonesian invasion of 
Portuguese Timor, the Indonesian sub-regional military commander in East Timor, 
Colonel Purwanto, met with the leader of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent 
East Timor (Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste Independente, abbreviated Fretilin), 
Jose Alexandre "Kay Rala Xanana" Gusmao, and agreed to a temporary ceasefire. This 
was a truly extraordinary development. Indonesian officials had long insisted that the 
1976 act of "integration" was final and irreversible. With the fall of the last Fretilin base 
areas in the eastern sector in October 1978 and in the western sector in early 1979, the 
Indonesian military (ABRI) believed that the resistance had been reduced to a mere one 
hundred rebels, who were now euphemistically referred to as a "band of security 
disturbers" (gerombolan pengacau keamanan). In 1981, ABRI mobilized at least 60,000 
civilians to sweep across the territory to flush out those remaining individuals. And in 
mid-January 1983, Colonel Purwanto told journalists that "the band of [security] 
disturbers in East Timor, who are the remnants of Fretilin forces, have no more than 
one hundred weapons and five hundred members."1 And yet, the resistance not only
1 Paraphrased in "Gangguan Fretilin Sudah Tidak Berarti, Timor Timur Terbuka Untuk Dikunjungi," Sinar 
Harapan, January 15,1983.
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survived but won tactical victories. None was more significant than the ceasefire 
negotiated in March 1983.
The origins of the ceasefire process can be traced to a peculiar convergence of 
events in September 1982. The first of these was the appointment of Mario Carrascalao 
as the new governor of the territory, on September 18. Born in Venilale in 1936, 
Carrascalao is the son of an anarchist political deportee from Portugal who married the 
daughter of the traditional ruler of Venilale and became one of the leading scions of the 
Portuguese colonial elite and owner of a vast coffee plantation. Mdrio attended 
primary school in Dili, but at age twelve was shipped off to Lisbon to continue his 
education, eventually graduating from university in 1968 with a degree in forestry. 
Returning to Timor in 1970, Mdrio served in the Agriculture and Forestry Service and 
was selected as one of the three Timorese representatives in the Estado Novo (New 
State) parliament in Lisbon. Following the April 1974 Armed Forces Movement seizure 
of power in Lisbon, Mdrio and his brother Joao were among the founding members of 
the pro-Portuguese Timorese Democratic Union (Uniao Democrdtica Timorense, UDT). 
In August 1975, however, Joao led an unsuccessful "anti-communist movement," and 
after Fretilin forces routed UDT, the brothers fled across the border into Indonesian 
West Timor. In early 1976, Mdrio was appointed to the East Timor Provisional 
Assembly and in June that year was part of the delegation that presented a "petition" 
to Indonesian President Suharto requesting "integration" into Indonesia. In 1978 Mdrio 
joined the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, serving from 1980 until 1982 at the 
Consulate in New York and with the Indonesian delegation at the United Nations. 
After the disastrous governorships of Arnaldo dos Reis Ardujo (1976-78) and 
Guilherme Gongalves (1978-82), Indonesian officials hoped the intelligent and worldly 
Mdrio Carrascalao would provide greater international credibility and, perhaps, some 
practical leadership of the provincial administration, too.
The second key event in September 1982 was an impromptu meeting between 
Fretilin leader Xanana Gusmao and East Timor's Apostolic Administrator, Martinho 
da Costa Lopes, in the village of Mehara, in Lautem District, directly under the nose of 
the Indonesian military. When word of this meeting got out, Indonesian officials were 
furious. However, military officers soon followed this example, putting out word that 
they would like to meet with resistance leaders. The first such meeting was with a local 
Falintil commander named Jose da Conceigao, near the town of Lautem. Further 
meetings followed. It was in this environment that, in December 1982, Xanana Gusmao 
sent a letter to Governor Mario Carrascalao (though the letter did not reach him until 
early February 1983). In the letter, Gusmao explained that the Marxist-Leninist Fretilin 
Party (MLF) had been established "as a logical consequence of the revolutionary 
process," dismissed calls that had emerged in emigre circles in Lisbon for a united 
Movement for the Liberation of Timor Dili, and boldly challenged "all nationalists" to 
join in "National Unity" under the leadership of MLF.2
As low-level contacts progressed in early 1983, ABRI proposed that Governor 
Mario Carrascalao represent Indonesia during the negotiations. Fretilin rejected this 
proposal. Instead, a series of meetings took place, gradually working up the respective
2 This letter is reproduced for the first time in Carrascalao's autobiography; see Mario Viegas Carrascalao, 
Timor: Antes do Futuro (Dili: Livraria Mau Huran, 2006), pp. 167-74. Gusmao's letter refers to both MNTD 
and MNLTD without explanation. Carrascalao dismisses MNTD as "a group of lunatics in Lisbon."
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chains of command. The turning point came at a meeting on March 20 between Xanana 
Gusmao and an ABRI delegation led by two majors, Willem da Costa and Estafanus.3 
At the meeting Xanana Gusmao laid out a four-point peace plan that included: (1) the 
withdrawal of Indonesian troops, (2) the involvement of a UN peace-keeping force, (3) 
plans for a popular consultation on the future, and (4) the maintenance of Fretilin's 
armed wing, Falintil,4 to protect the population.5 Three days later another meeting was 
held at Larigutu, near Mount Mundo Perdido, on the Baucau-Viqueque border. The 
Indonesian delegation at the meeting included Colonel Purwanto, seven members of 
the Secret Warfare Command (Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha, abbreviated 
Kopassandha), Aleixo Ximenes (from Venilale), and Felipe Dias Quintas, the liurai 
(king) of Lospalos. The Fretilin contingent included Xanana Gusmao; sub-commanders 
Jose da Conceigao, Falur Txai, and Okan; and a platoon of Falintil soldiers. After the 
two delegations agreed to the ceasefire, an Indonesian helicopter brought Governor 
Carrascalao to the site, where he spoke with Xanana Gusmao for approximately forty- 
five minutes.6
Both sides had reasons to want a ceasefire. For Indonesia, the agreement had less to 
do with the strength of the resistance than with domestic politics and international 
relations. On the one hand, the 1982 national legislative election marked the beginning 
of the end of one political cycle; March 1983 marked the start of the next cycle, with the 
inevitable reselection of Suharto to a fourth term as president and the appointment of a 
new cabinet. Knowing full well that his tenure as ABRI commander-in-chief would end 
shortly, General Yusuf had little to lose by experimenting with a new approach to the 
problem of East Timor. If the negotiations did bear fruit, he had much to gain. On the 
other hand, and of greater importance, Indonesia sought to defray international 
concern about the illegal occupation and massive human rights abuses in East Timor, 
and the ceasefire agreement provided a window of opportunity within which to host 
an Australian diplomatic visit and lobby for Canberra's recognition of Indonesian 
sovereignty over the territory.
For Fretilin, the ceasefire provided much-needed breathing room to reorganize, to 
widen its contacts with the civilian population, and, as the Fretilin external delegation 
proudly declared, to claim an international victory. The cessation of hostilities allowed 
resistance leaders to visit villages, towns, and even some of the urban centers. There 
were also a host of local meetings between ABRI and Fretilin/Falintil, including in 
Lore, Beaco, Waitame, Macadique, Ossu, Laissorlai, and Hatubuilico. These meetings 
involved volleyball games and replenishment of the guerrillas' provisions and 
supplies. Furthermore, during the ceasefire, Fretilin/Falintil commanders built up 
personal relations with East Timorese serving in the Indonesian military and its
3 Major Willem da Costa was born in Kupang in 1949 and graduated from the National Military Academy 
in 1971. No information is available about Major Estafanus.
4 "Falintil" is the abbreviation of Forgas Armadas de Libertagao Nacional de Timor-Leste, the Armed 
Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor.
5 Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, The War Against East Timor (London: Zed Books, 1984), pp. 72-73. 
A transcript of this meeting is available in Jill Jolliffe, Timor: Terra Sangrenta (Lisbon: O Jornal, 1989), pp. 
163-70.
6 Carrascalao has provided conflicting accounts of this encounter. See, for example, "Interview with Mario 
Carrascalao," Indonesia 76 (October 2003): 6; and Carrascalao, Timor: Antes do Futuro, pp. 181-90.
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civilian auxiliary units and lobbied for them to defect.7 As Apostolic Administrator 
Martinho da Costa Lopes noted, "as part of the ceasefire agreement, Indonesian 
helicopters were taking food and medicines to guerrillas in the mountains and 
bringing their sick and wounded into Dili hospital ... The people were very happy 
with the respite from the war and for the first time in years were able to plant decent 
crops."8
On May 4, 1983, Xanana Gusmao wrote a second long letter to Governor 
Carrascalao calling for national unity.9 Governor Carrascalao did not respond. On May 
27, according to Carrascalao's biography, Colonel Purwanto informed him that 
Gusmao had requested to meet with the governor the next day at a location called 
Ariana, five kilometers from Carrascalao's place of birth, in Venilale, Baucau District.10 
It is not clear why General Benny Murdani allowed Xanana Gusmao to meet privately 
with Governor Mario Carrascalao.11 In mid-April, General Murdani had said explicitly 
that he was giving Colonel Purwanto and Governor Carrascalao three months to make 
the ceasefire work, a deadline that wasn't due until July 12, 1983. In any case, the May 
meeting went ahead. Father Locatelli, an Italian priest based at the Fatumaca minor 
seminary near Baucau, and Aleixo Ximenes, a prominent and highly controversial pro­
integration figure from Venilale, served as intermediaries for this meeting, and they 
accompanied Governor Carrascalao to the meeting site. Once there, Governor 
Carrascalao and Xanana Gusmao had a private discussion. In his autobiography, 
Carrascalao writes: 'There were no photographs or recordings."12
But a recording was made. The following text is a translation from an Indonesian 
transcript of the May 1983 meeting between Governor Carrascalao and Xanana 
Gusmao, who was concurrently the Fretilin National Political Commissar, the 
commander-in-chief of Falintil, and a member of the Fretilin Central Committee. The 
transcript was found among Indonesian military documents recovered by activists in 
Dili after the August 30,1999, referendum and ensuing violence.13
The Transcript
There are a number of practical features of the document worth mentioning. The 
twenty-two-page typed transcript is cut off at the margins, indicating that it is a
7 In early August, East Timorese serving in the Indonesian military staged a levantamento (uprising) in 
Viqueque and joined the resistance; plans for an uprising in Lautem did not materialize.
8 J. Jolliffe, ed., Timor Newsletter 11,3 (October 1983): 6, cited in Ernest Chamberlain, "The Struggle in 
Iliomar: Resistance in Rural East Timor," unpublished manuscript, p. 23.
9 The letter is reproduced in Carrascalao, Timor: Antes do Futuro, pp. 199-210.
10 Ibid., p. 217.
11 Murdani replaced Yusuf as commander-in-chief of ABRI on March 28,1983. Murdani may, in fact, have 
trusted Carrascalao. Even after the first low-level meetings between ABRI and Fretilin had taken place, 
Carrascalao told the press that "the integration of East Timor is complete. There is nothing that can change 
that." Quoted in "Gubernur Carrascalao: Dukung Atau Tidak Integrasi Timor Timur Sudah Selesai," Sinar 
Harapan, March 7,1983.
12 Carrascalao, Timor: Antes do Futuro, p. 217.
13 Despite ABRI's efforts to destroy all Indonesian records, a reasonably large number of documents were 
recovered. The transcript is in the collection of documents held by Yayasan Hak, a human rights NGO in 
Dili.
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photocopy of the original. In the top right-hand corner of the cover page the notation 
"DAN.WIL 11.3" is written in marker, indicating that this copy was once held by the 
provincial police commander. The cover page indicates that the meeting took place on 
May 29, 1983. This may be incorrect. In his autobiography, Mdrio Carrascalao states 
that the meeting took place on May 28.14 15Furthermore, the document was recovered 
together with two other documents. The first is the text of a speech by Xanana Gusmao 
on March 27, 1983; the speech was delivered at a mass conducted by Pastor Locatelli at 
a place called St. Metacoa, and the document includes the Tetum and Indonesian 
versions of the hymns sung at the mass. The second document, which is typed, has the 
handwritten title "Letter of Response from the Sub-regional Commander to Xanana" 
(Surat jawaban Dan Rem Kepada Xanana)}5
The format of the meeting is odd. The transcript's first sixteen and a half pages 
record speeches: first by Mario Carrascalao, next by Xanana Gusmao, and then a very 
long response by Mdrio Carrascalao. Only in the final five pages is there back-and- 
forth dialogue between the two speakers. The reason for this may be quite simple. 
Despite Carrascalao's autobiographical claim that there were "no photographs or 
recordings," the evident presence of a tape recorder meant that both men knew they 
were performing as much for the Indonesian military as for each other. Governor 
Carrascalao even goes out of his way to say as much during the meeting: "I am a 
person who will say what I think even if I am in front of a tape recorder." One cannot 
help but imagine this line was delivered with a playful smile and a wink!
It is also important to highlight a number of problems with the transcript as an 
accurate record of what was said. Most obviously, Carrascalao and Gusmao conversed 
in Portuguese, a language that few if any Indonesian military officers or officials spoke, 
hence the need for an Indonesian-language translation. Unfortunately, no information 
is available about the translator, though one suspects that he or she must have been an 
East Timorese educated in Portuguese schools prior to 1975 and, perhaps, also 
someone who may have learned a fair amount of Indonesian prior to the invasion. 
Nevertheless, the Indonesian is awkward, often grammatically incorrect, and is riddled 
with strange word choices. Furthermore, the tone of the translation is bureaucratic 
"New Orderese," often clearly inappropriate for conveying the literary, even lyrical, 
Portuguese in which the two speakers were educated. Two specific, illustrative 
examples should be mentioned. While both men most certainly used "senhor" (sir, 
mister) to refer to the other, the translator has used the Indonesian "bapak" (father, 
sir). Elsewhere, however, both speakers refer to the Indonesian military as "bapak- 
bapak," which we know from interviews with Mdrio Carrascalao is, in fact, correct. 
The names used for East Timor (the translator employs the Indonesian name "Timor- 
Timur" throughout) are more problematic. There can be no doubt that Xanana Gusmao 
referred to the territory as "Timor-Leste." Governor Carrascalao may also have used 
the Portuguese name, though, given the tenor of his arguments, it is quite likely that he 
used the Indonesian "Timor Timur." To avoid erroneous distinctions and for the sake
14 See Carrascalao, Timor: Antes do Futuro, p. 217. It is equally important to note that the Indonesian 
translation was completed on June 1,1983. The following day, ABRI Commander-in-chief Murdani sent a 
letter to Gusmao warning that Indonesia would "destroy you if you are not willing to be cooperative." The 
Age, August 17,1983, quoted in Budiardjo and Liong, The War Against East Timor, p. 139.
15 A Portuguese translation of this document is included in Carrascalao, Timor: Antes do Future, pp. 213-14.
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of simplicity, the English translation presented here employs "East Timor" throughout, 
except in instances where Governor Carrascalao is clearly referring to the Indonesian 
province "Timor Timur." The following translation has been kept as close to the 
Indonesian transcript as possible.
Realist versus Revolutionary
What, then, of the content of the discussion between Carrascalao and Gusmao? 
Governor Carrascalao's speeches are those of a realist: this is how the world works; it 
isn't pretty, but that's how it goes and we have to make the best of it. He provides 
extended arguments in favor of integration and the development that, he says, 
Indonesia will bring to East Timor. "With Indonesia, East Timor can become something 
other than it is now." At the same time, he attempts to explain to Gusmao, whom he 
treats as ignorant of realpolitik, why foreign governments and the United Nations will 
not come to the rescue of the resistance. "Don't hope for anything from the Portuguese. 
Believe me!" He also displays his considerable knowledge of global events and 
discusses his experience while working with the Indonesian delegation at the United 
Nations. His examples range from the dilemmas in newly independent states in Africa 
and the Caribbean to Cold War manipulations in Namibia and Ethiopia, from the 
intricacies of the political left in Portugal and France to separatist movements 
elsewhere in Indonesia.
Gusmao, in contrast, plays the revolutionary. "I am a Marxist," he states twice. 
Although there is little in his presentation that resembles class analysis, the role of 
dialectics (and, more specifically, Maoist analyses of war and guerrilla strategy) is 
apparent.16 Of greater importance for the historical record, however, is his discussion 
of the formation of the Partido Marxista-Leninista Fretilin and his call for "National 
Unity." These points deserve some elaboration.
With the fall of Fretilin's bases in the east in late 1978 and in the west in early 1979, 
armed resistance to the Indonesian occupation was reduced to small, dispersed groups 
largely cutoff from the civilian population. Over the next two years, the surviving 
Fretilin leadership in the east slowly built up a network of contacts, reassessed the 
situation, and adjusted to the reality of prolonged guerrilla warfare. Scattered attacks 
were launched against the Indonesian military as well as the new "settlements" into 
which the populace had been forcibly relocated. In March 1981, Fretilin leaders met in 
Lacluta for a "National Reorganization Conference." The conventional wisdom among 
East Timorese and most foreign authors is that the policy of national unity was 
initiated at this time. This view is based on repeated claims made by Gusmao. But one 
should note that Gusmao's early writings are remarkably vague on this historic event. 
In a letter to the Fretilin Delegation of External Services dated October 13, 1982, for 
example, Gusmao simply writes: "Here the nation was reorganized, the liberation 
forces restructured, and a new leadership appointed."17 Any mention of "national
16 In his English-language autobiography, which, unfortunately, ends in 1981, Gusmao describes how, in 
late 1976, "I managed to get hold of a copy of the 'Thoughts of Chairman Mao' and it was the only 
personal property I carried around with me." See Xanana Gusmao, To Resist Is to Win! The Autobiography of 
Xanana Gusmao, ed. Sarah Niner (Richmond, Victoria: Aurora Books, 2000), p. 47.
17 Xanana Gusmao, "The National Council of Revolutionary Resistance Salutes the Fretilin Delegation of 
External Services," in To Resist Is to Win, p. 72.
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unity" is conspicuously absent. Unfortunately, Gusmao's subsequent version of events 
has been accepted uncritically by many authors. The Commission for Reception, Truth, 
and Reconciliation report, Chega!, offers the following account:
The political military structure and leadership of the resistance was 
reorganized, and the Revolutionary Council of the National Resistance (CRRN) 
was formed to take overall charge of the Resistance. The CRRN was to be an 
umbrella forum for all pro-independence elements, not only Fretilin, and was a 
significant step away from the hard-line policies of 1977 when Fretilin had been 
declared a Marxist-Leninist Party (Partido Marxista-Leninista Fretilin, PMLF), 
and toward national unity.18
As the use of the word revolucionario in the name CRRN should alert the reader, 
this account could not be further from the truth. The party's name and ideological 
principles were not changed in 1977, but rather at the Lacluta conference in 1981.19 This 
conference, at which Gusmao served as "conference president" and was elected 
National Political Commissar and reconfirmed as commander-in-chief of Falintil, 
addressed three questions: (1) the necessity of reorganizing the nation, (2) the necessity 
of correcting past errors, and (3) the necessity of defining the party. And it was here 
that the name of the party was changed from Fretilin to Partido Marxista-Leninista 
Fretilin (abbreviated MLF).20 This signified the need for a Marxist-Leninist party to 
play the leading role in a front that would "unite all nationalists."21 Nationalists were 
identified based on their class position (workers and peasants). However, neither UDT 
nor Apodeti is mentioned in the conference proceedings and no call is made for 
cooperation, let alone unity across party lines. This was an unabashed statement of 
position and solidarity under the party banner.
The decision in 1981 to base the party formally on Marxism-Leninism and to 
change the party name to MLF must be understood within the broader context. Having 
lost any pretense of maintaining a territorial base, without international borders 
behind which to hide, and with no hope of receiving outside assistance, the party 
leadership sought to come to a new understanding of the situation. Marxism-Leninism 
provided a theoretical basis from which such a reassessment could be carried out. With 
its emphasis on self-sufficiency, Maoism provided an answer to Timor's isolation. But 
of greatest importance, the adoption of Marxism-Leninism ensured a common
18 See Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor, Chega! The Report o f  the 
Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR) (Dili: CAVR, 2005), esp. Chapter 3, 
"History of the Conflict," p. 96, at www.ictj.org, accessed February 9, 2009. Gusmao has alleged that 
Marxism was "acclaimed" at the Laline conference in 1977, but what this meant is not clear. See Gusmao, 
To Resist Is to Win!, p. 47.
19 Oddly, in one place Chega! claims that Marxism-Leninism was adopted in August 1977, but elsewhere it 
is suggested that this took place on October 16,1977, when Nicolau Lobato was declared president 
(Chega!, paragraph 302, page 78). CAVR was fully aware that the name change did not take place until 
1981, but this was only mentioned six paragraphs after the initial claim. The only sources provided are 
Xanana Gusmao's autobiography and an interview he gave with CAVR.
20 Republica Democratica de Timor Leste/Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente, "Acta da 
T. Conferencia Nacional," pp. 32-33 (mimeograph in author's possession).
21 Republica Democratica de Timor Leste/Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente, "Discurso 
de Abertura de 1° Conferencia Nacional decorrida de 1 a 8 de Margo de 1981 na regiao Nakroma," pp. 24, 
29-30.
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language and set of analytical tools with which, it was hoped, the resistance could 
overcome the internal divisions that had fractured the resistance during the late 1970s.
"Opportunists will Emerge"
The transcript of the meeting between Governor Carrascalao and Xanana Gusmao 
is not only important because it enriches our understanding of the 1983 ceasefire; it 
also sheds light on the relationship between these two men from 1999 until the present. 
The historic 1983 meeting was the basis for a long-term "understanding," as Mario 
Carrascalao put it, between the two. Under the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (1999-2002), Gusmao was the favorite interlocutor of 
international actors, including the UN, but he came out openly in opposition to 
Fretilin. Carrascalao backed him throughout. In October 2002, as Gusmao's attacks on 
the new Fretilin government escalated, Carrascalao stated: "I know that President 
Xanana, in his entire soul, heart, and mind, is a true democrat. Compassion is the 
dominant value in his politics. And Xanana's performance is not his political specialty 
alone, but it is the performance of the entire people of East Timor. The people truly 
understand what freedom is, what independence means, what oppression means."22 
Five years later, having forced Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri from office, Gusmao could 
count on Carrascalao's Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata) to join his 
new Parliamentary Majority Alliance government. But it was not all to be smooth 
sailing. In July 2007, when Gusmao's government was facing widespread charges of 
corruption and abuse of power, Mario Carrascalao stood up in parliament and angrily 
declared "if the ministers cannot answer questions from members of parliament, then 
we are just a bunch of yes-men\"23
Today, however, perhaps the single most relevant lesson from the conversation 
between Carrascalao and Gusmao under the trying circumstances of 1983 is to be 
found in their thoughts about a future that lay ahead and that now, post­
independence, has finally arrived. Gusmao explains that, "as the leader of the struggle 
I have told my boys that after the war [is over] the problems we will face will be even 
more difficult. 'Don't think that after the war is over everything will be easy and we 
can sit back. No!"' More poignant still, at the beginning of his first exposition, 
Governor Carrascalao notes that if national unity cannot be achieved, "opportunists 
will emerge who will exploit the situation for their own benefit, but those benefits will 
not be enjoyed for long, as is the case for many of us 'down here' [in Dili] for whom the 
benefits will not be eternal."
22 See "Wawancara khusus dengan Mario Carrascalao (1): Rakyat jangan dikembalikan ke tahun 1975," 
Suara Timor Lorosae, October 21, 2002.
23 He used the English expression "yes-men." Personal communication with a member of the UN 
responsible for monitoring the parliamentary debates, Dili, last week of July 2008.
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Transcript of the Recording of the 
Meeting between the Governor and
Xanana on May 29, 1983
Before the governor entered the meeting room, Xanana and Father Locatelli24 
discussed the weather, the seasons, rice paddies, and so forth, which the translator 
considers to be unimportant to include here.
[Cassette I, Side A]
Governor: Alright, Senhor Gusmao,25 we meet again. I received your letter and I 
read it with great interest. I did not answer your letter because I prefer to meet with 
you face to face so that we can discuss the contents of the letter. That is my position 
because I am not a cynical person; that doesn't mean that you are cynical because you 
sent a letter to me. I am a person who wants to speak clearly so that the person 
listening to me doesn't misunderstand what I mean.
As in our earlier meeting, the reason I have come is to show you that I am someone 
who struggles so that the people can feel free from the undesirable actions of certain 
rogue elements (there is no need to mention their names here) who hold the view that 
East Timor is a stolen territory [wilayah rampasan], where people do not have any rights 
and are not able to claim their rights, except for those that are granted to them. I don't 
agree with that view, of course. What I mean is that no one knows what East Timor 
will be like in the future. I am not someone who changes his mind and goals easily, but 
if I cannot reach my goals, I am also someone who works so that those goals may be 
realized by our children or grandchildren. However, I will not allow anyone to lead the 
people into a fatal situation or lead them like sheep, because nothing positive can come 
from a people being led like a herd of sheep. People treated like that, whatever the 
circumstances, will always be ruled without real freedom.
In this matter, I think that the people of East Timor must be prepared with real 
awareness and intelligence so that they can take advantage of the opportunities that 
history will present for them to determine their own fate.
Concerning your appeal for National Unity, I think that unity needs to be created 
because if the East Timorese people are divided they will "devour" [makan-memakan\ 
one another. And if they devour one another, a people will not progress, but rather will 
permit the emergence of "Partisanship" [Partidarisme], which will prevent them from 
reaching a desired goal, and in such circumstances opportunists will emerge who will
24 As noted in the introduction, Father Locatelli is an Italian priest who was head of the minor seminary at 
Fatumaca, in Baucau District.
25 Throughout the transcript, "Gusmao" is misspelled "Gusmau."
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exploit the situation for their own benefit, but those benefits will not be enjoyed for 
long, as is the case for many of us "down there" for whom the benefits will not be 
eternal.26
Even though I have not practiced my real profession for years, I could leave East 
Timor [p. 2], Wherever I am, I will not have any trouble living a decent life free from 
psychological pressures or political deceptions. But [I am] not like that! I believed that I 
must return to East Timor to contribute to the resistance [perlawanan] as well, but the 
resistance must be based on the various [points] I made above.27 That is my attitude 
because I know there is much injustice, much reprehensible behavior, many people 
who have been destroyed because a number of people born in this land want to put 
their own interests first without paying any attention to the interests of others.
It is clear that fundamentally the call for my return to East Timor was determined 
by internal factors, but it must also be acknowledged that my return to East Timor was
also influenced by the misdeeds of Timorese leaders at the tim e...........I could just as
well live ........... (unclear) ........... not in Jakarta or in the United States. I put my
children in school in East Timor. They may learn whatever languages they can, but 
they must go to school in East Timor so that they know the reality in this land, the 
reality of the people, so they too live in this reality. I don't have words to describe how 
I see the future of East Timor, but I think that my actions will speak for themselves on 
this matter.
If I fight for the honor of each and every Timorese, it is my hope that returning 
dignity to the East Timorese people will be the basic capital [modal dasar] for the East 
Timorese people to fulfill their ideals. But I can also say that the basic capital for that— 
dignity, honesty, unity—must not be misused.
The road we must travel is a long one!!! Our way might be blocked and difficult to 
pass, but with necessary pauses we will be able to continue to our desired goal. Many 
things will make this possible; but it is not the United Nations that will determine this.
When I was at the UN, I never responded to the UN decisions about the East Timor 
case. I didn't respond because what goes on at the UN is a complete "charade." This 
year at the UN Forum, the majority of votes will be for Indonesia. So don't pin your 
hopes on the UN. But that doesn't mean that the aims of the East Timorese people will 
not be fulfilled. The development of East Timor within Indonesia is one step. Indonesia 
itself is a country undergoing constant/unstopping development.
We must analyze the Indonesian Constitution, we must analyze all of its structures 
and all of the laws.
Within Indonesia, East Timor can become something other than it is now. But for 
me, East Timor must become what the people want it to become [p. 3]. East Timor 
cannot just become what Mario Carrascalao (mentions his own name) wants it to be or 
what is wanted by people with radical views. East Timor must become what the 
people want it to be. Many people have misunderstood this.
26 There are quotation marks around the words "bawah Sana." This appears to refer to Dili. In this passage, 
Governor Carrascalao eerily prophesies the current situation in Timor-Leste.
27 In light of Governor Carrascalao's arguments, his use of the word "resistance" twice in this sentence is 
odd; this is most likely a poor translation from the original Portuguese to the Indonesian.
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Because of that they reject opportunities that exist for dialogue and negotiation. I 
don't want a settlement to be reached only for an instant. Fundamentally, what I want 
is for the people of East Timor to be prepared for the future. I am certain that after
achieving certain minimal goals the Government of Indonesia will ........... and East
Timor will become what the people want it to be, because the Government of 
Indonesia surely will not want resistance to continue forever, so long as unity can be 
achieved between the component parts, that is the Government of Indonesia in Dili 
and the Government of Indonesia in Jakarta.28 I've seen from personal observation that 
Dili does not reflect Jakarta, and so I can imagine where Jakarta wants to proceed and 
also where Dili wants to g o ...........(unclear)............
Actually, what the Government of Indonesia wants for Timor Timur is for this 
territory not to be in a situation in which the law s...........
Of course, if we pay attention to developments in Indonesia, the situation in Timor 
Timur will not be this way forever. I am convinced that several factors will lead to 
improvement; these factors stem from the firm determination of the leaders and also 
have to be brought into being by local conditions. Of course, if we look at conditions in 
one country in economic terms, and this is what I want to focus on here, things aren't 
so bad! Indonesia is a country that is developing faster and faster year by year. Last 
year the World Bank published a development index of Third World countries. 
Economic growth in Western European countries was only 2 percent [per year], while 
in Indonesia growth was 5 percent and we are very satisfied with this. Clearly that rate 
is only one small part of everything that must be accomplished.
Nevertheless, compared to other Third World countries, Indonesia has greater 
economic potential. And clearly that must be considered within the context of the 
current global recession, of which no country is free. But it must be admitted that the 
recession has not fully hit Indonesia, or in other words Indonesia has been late to feel 
the impact of the recession. I always follow developments and the efforts of the 
Indonesian Government regarding this matter, and I am of the opinion that the 
recession in Indonesia will soon end. Consider, for example, last year decisions were 
made that the implementation of certain projects would be cancelled, but this year 
decisions have been made that these cancelled projects can now be implemented. It is 
true that oil prices have fallen, but think about one thing: Indonesia does not produce 
the same kind of oil as countries in the Middle East; Indonesian oil has low sulfur 
content, the country has not lost buyers for its oil [p. 4], It is also clear that although 
Indonesia has already compromised with other countries to reduce oil exports, its 
high-quality oil will fetch high prices.
I don't have much to say about the strength of the Indonesian Armed Forces.29 But I 
can relay some of the ideas/opinions that I have found in articles I have read. 
According to these articles, Indonesia is the only country that can dominate this region 
militarily. Of course, in the military field, Indonesia's advantage is not only 
determined by its population (150 million people), [but] what counts here is the quality
28 The Indonesian translation is badly garbled. Carrascalao seems to be suggesting that differences 
between the Indonesian state/ military in Jakarta and Dili are preventing a resolution to the conflict.
29 In the Indonesian transcript, this sentence is part of the previous paragraph.
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of its weapons, so that in military matters Indonesia can be rated number one [in 
Southeast Asia].
Therefore, one may conclude that Indonesia's military advantage is both 
quantitative and qualitative. Its factories produce what it needs, so that Indonesia is 
self-sufficient in this regard. I don't mean that this will determine the future of 
Indonesia. As you know, Indonesia consists of 3,000 islands, and the peoples living on 
those islands do not have the same culture, the same customs, the same way of life, or 
the same aspirations. Therefore, to create a spirit of National Unity in Indonesia you 
have to take into account the factors I mentioned earlier, because if there isn't a balance 
between these factors the outcome will be the disintegration of the country. Another 
problem that could result in the disintegration of Indonesia is if Muslims declare an 
Islamic Government, [in which case] Indonesia will fall apart. If that happens, there 
will be an opportunity for everyone to become master of his own house. Ah, but for 
that to happen the conditions would have to be right, because the Indonesian 
government is very prudently organized. Working within the Government itself is an 
opportunity to create those conditions. But one has to take into account the fact that the 
Indonesian Government has adopted an intelligent attitude toward those Provinces 
which are backward in terms of technology [tehnilogis] and education, and will 
[ensure] the equal distribution of production facilities and education.
Furthermore, it would not be fair to measure the Indonesian system of Governance 
in terms of conditions in Timor Timur. One might say that Timor Timur was not 
included in the original blueprint for Indonesia. The Indonesian system of governance 
has what are called vertical agencies and horizontal agencies.30 These are as follows: 
vertical agencies are agencies in a certain Province/Region which, because of 
insufficient capacity to develop certain sectors, are directly under the Central 
Government [p. 5], Once a Province/Region has the capacity to develop those sectors 
on its own, the vertical authorities are abolished, meaning the Central Government will 
no longer exercise absolute control over the Province. At this stage, the Central 
Government only has absolute authority in the areas of Military and Security affairs. 
Today this is what is being regulated by laws.
Ah! We (Timor Timur) are among a number of Provinces with very few 
autonomous government agencies. At present in our area the autonomous government 
agencies are as follows:
• Department of Agriculture: — 50 percent comes from the Center;
— 50 percent we raise ourselves.
• Department of Education & Culture: — 50 percent comes from Jakarta;
— 50 percent we raise ourselves.
• Taxes and Customs: — Entirely under our control.
Why are we in a situation like this?
30 The original says: "Instansi-instansi vertical dan instansi-instansi horizontal.'
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Because we do not have the ability to pay for our own budget. Imagine, this year 
we need 57 billion rupiah for development, administration, and so on. How can we 
obtain that much money when our revenue is so little? Last year our revenue was only 
about 250 million rupiah; wah, like a drop of water in the ocean. Converted into [US] 
Dollars, that is only 250 thousand dollars. If, at present, we became Independent/stand 
on our own, how could we manage to develop with so small a sum of money? For 
small countries like Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, or the Dominican Republic, the annual 
budget for four or five representatives at the UN requires 250 or 300 thousand dollars. 
Indonesia needs two million dollars per year for its Ambassador and staff. And, there 
are also countries such as The Republic of Solomon Islands that do not have permanent 
representatives at the UN. They only come to attend sessions of the General Assembly, 
and afterward they go straight home because they cannot afford to stay there for long. 
There are also African countries like the Central African Republic, Gambia, and others 
that do not have a permanent representative at the UN. They only come to the UN 
when there is a session of the General Assembly. The strange thing is that, just before a 
session of the General Assembly, one vote can be bought with a plane ticket, so the 
resolutions made at the UN do not succeed. As for the big powers, they only make a 
fuss when their interests are threatened. Their politics are Pragmatic [Praktis], i.e. 
pushing for what benefits them without a care for the fate of the people in little 
Countries. For example: Western Sahara, which is recognized by most African 
countries, cannot make any progress [at the UN] because, behind the scenes, there are 
other stronger countries that oppose the wishes of Western Sahara [p. 6], This is also 
true in the case of Namibia, which already has a government outside of the country 
which is made up of UN member states. In the case of the Namibia Forum—of which 
Indonesia is a part and for which I myself was the representative from Indonesia— 
which could be said to have a government, headed by an African country, and with 
members consisting of Soviet Union, countries from Northern Europe, Latin America, 
and Africa, and Australia, all of which supported Namibia's right to immediate 
independence.
But in this context, other factors were in play: The United States wished to exploit 
Namibia's uranium, and because of that the United States wanted a Namibian 
Government that would favor the interests of the United States, whereas there was no 
certainty that the Namibian Government would accede to US aims. That would make 
Namibia dependent on the wishes of the United States. Looked at from another angle, 
Namibia is not a signatory to the International Maritime Convention. And so, without 
having to worry about legal claims, ships from the Soviet Union were free to exploit 
Namibia's maritime riches. And when, during a meeting in Tanzania, the delegation 
from the Soviet Union suggested that the Namibia Forum sign the International 
Maritime Convention in the name of the Namibian people, I refused [to vote in favor]. 
The representative from SWAPO31 diplomatically suggested to me that the issue be 
settled 'among friends.' I asked him: "Lho!,32 why don't you take a stand?"
This cannot be condoned [just] because there are accusations that the exploitation 
of South Africa is Colonial exploitation. How can one speak of the Soviet Union's 
exploitation of Namibia's maritime riches when the United States, West Germany,
31 SWAPO is the South West Africa People's Organization in Namibia.
32 "Lho" is a Javanese/ Indonesian exclamation of surprise or emphasis.
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France, England, and others are not allowed to exploit South Africa?33 The SWAPO 
representative responded: 'There isn't anything I can do. The Soviet Union is the only 
country that gives us weapons." Because this issue [concerning Namibia and the 
International Maritime Convention] required debate, finally it was decided to hold a 
vote. But because it was already known that the Soviet Union would lose—and it is 
very unpleasant when one has to reject a motion from a strong Country—eventually 
the proposal was withdrawn. Up until I had to return home, one didn't hear another 
word about the matter of exploiting Namibia's maritime riches. On another occasion, I 
wanted to raise this issue, [but] I was advised by an Arab Country not to speak about 
this again.
And so in my opinion, whatever any country in the world might say, the words are 
simply instruments for the pursuit of its own interests. What Australia says needs to be 
examined thoroughly. Australia is trying to create the optimal conditions to reject the 
Liberal Party convention that will be held this coming June or July. This June the 
Australian Prime Minister will visit Indonesia. When a Prime Minister visits another 
Country he must have concrete proposals which will promote relations between his 
own Country and the Country he is visiting [p. 7], Last week the Australian 
ambassador to Indonesia began the necessary preparations so that the Australian 
Prime Minister can successfully meet the Government of Indonesia. The Australian 
diplomat who has been given this assignment once met with me. When we were 
saying goodbye, the Australian diplomat wished me success. He did not say that, in 
the coming meetings, at which it is very likely East Timor will be discussed, he will 
provide information that is either favorable or detrimental to Indonesia. In returning 
his regards, I only said that nothing important has happened yet, but he held to his 
position because, he said, it is based on what he saw first-hand in Dili.
I hope that this will allow Gusmao to take a realistic view of the situation. With 
New Zealand, this is how it is: no matter what position the Government of Australia 
takes, New Zealand will not change its attitude toward Indonesia since there are 
groups working to ensure good relations between Indonesia and New Zealand.
That stance is a result of New Zealand's dependence on Indonesia, because New 
Zealand needs oil from Indonesia, but its major [trade commodity] is sugar [which 
Indonesia does not need]. As is well known, Japan is a Country that has few natural 
resources, while Indonesia is among the top countries when it comes to natural 
resources. Because of that, Japan continually has to make approaches to Indonesia, 
especially to obtain fuel from Indonesia to keep its factories running. For that reason, 
Japan is the largest purchaser of oil and natural gas from Indonesia.
In Europe, a change in France could result in changes in the countries in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, it is necessary to pay close attention to 
relations between these Countries. Let's take a look at the case of Libya.34 Libya, which 
in Africa is known as Revolutionary Libya, at one point was forced to support 
Indonesia because it needed Indonesia's support in order to become a member of the
33 The Indonesian translation is not clear. Carrascalao probably meant to say: "How can one object to 
western exploitation of South Africa, but remain silent about Soviet exploitation of Namibia?"
34 The name given in the transcript is Liberia, but this is almost certainly a mistake on the part of the 
person who transcribed or translated the Portuguese language tape. In 1969, Muammar al-Gaddafi 
overthrew Lybia's King Idris and established a Revolutionary Command Council.
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International Monetary Fund, and by becoming a member of the IMF it was able to 
carry out certain maneuvers in such a way that the IMF's policies were in Libya's 
interests.
That is a picture of the intrigues that go on in international politics.
[recording is interrupted]
[Cassette I, Side B]
Xanana: So, then, what have we seen? If there is UDT and there is Fretilin, if there 
is a possibility of a Coalition, then why can't there be an understanding between us? 
Even if our side has made some mistakes, why can't there be an understanding 
between us on certain points?
All of this has made me think. As a member of the Fretilin Central Committee, 
which is responsible for the struggle, it is my obligation to answer the points above. Is 
there no possibility of ending our war by way of a course of National Unity [p. 8]?
If there has been a lack of clarity when it comes to definitions, particularly with 
regard to ideology—I have never hidden my political identity from anyone, and even 
now I claim that I am a Marxist—the matter can be cleared up. If during this war 
Fretilin has directed certain individuals toward a particular ideology, that does not 
mean that all followers of Fretilin are Marxists. This misunderstanding led all of us to 
make major mistakes. However, recently I have become aware of this. The party we 
have established (MLF) is intended for the purpose of definitions, that is, to define 
certain problems. Because I am an adherent of this ideology (meaning: Marxism- 
Leninism), fine, I can step aside. But Fretilin must mobilize people who think that East 
Timor can become an Independent Country [Negara Merdeka]. This definition is used so 
that we do not conflate one thing with something else, so that we do not go down the 
wrong road. I can explain that at its beginning a process is never clear, but those who 
are engaged in that process are forced to learn lessons from the mistakes they have 
made. Those who are left behind by the process while it is underway may have special 
characteristics, for example, those who are adherents of a religion, whether it be 
Catholicism or Protestantism or even Islam. They must be categorized by the religious 
organizations to which they belong, so as not to give rise to confusion. That is the only 
way to make progress. With regard to this idea, let me say that, based on each person's 
position, a Government that is intelligent in all regards will not give unconditional 
participation [to a particular party/position] with regard to the resolution of this war 
or this process in East Timor.35
35 The referent in this sentence is unclear. Gusmao is most likely referring to the predominant position of 
the Indonesian military within Indonesian policy circles. It is, however, also possible that he is criticizing 
the Indonesian government for favoring certain East Timorese actors (Apodeti and UDT) above others or 
is criticizing foreign governments for allowing Indonesia an "unconditional" role in how the war is 
resolved.
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I see in you someone who is of value to our homeland and also someone who is of 
use to us insofar as we can take stands that will direct our people and our land in the 
right direction. From this standpoint, I have set out several issues for you to consider.
So, my comrades and I think that if we cannot discuss these issues—both those 
relating to ourselves as well as those relating to everyone [all East Timorese]—we will 
not be able to achieve our aims. And the result of this: We [in the resistance] are always 
radical, both in our thinking and in our actions. And I can even say this: the last letter 
[I sent] was like a car's muffler [kanal-spoat] because we are determined to reduce the 
suffering of our people, but without betraying the dignity of the people. We [in the 
resistance] are not entitled—Senhor Mdrio has mentioned a people who are given 
orders without any freedom—to arrest or to repress our people. Our people will 
determine what they themselves want.
Because of that, throughout this process, I have always made an effort to 
understand the attitude of the Government in Jakarta toward this process. If the 
Indonesian government insists on "integration," I cannot accept it. I cannot accept it 
because I hold the principle that we can become Independent, we have the right to 
Independence [p. 9].
If such is the case, we will not waste our time negotiating. When my request was 
greeted with a threatening tone I thought: What must we do? Break off negotiation or 
.... Isn't the aim of our efforts to reduce the suffering of our people through a fitting 
and just settlement of this situation?
We [in the resistance] also want to end this situation. But we know and we are 
aware that we are also capable of continuing [in] this situation, and we know that the 
prolongation of this war will have tragic consequences for the people. So, as the person 
responsible for the struggle, what I have said is like [the noise from] a car's muffler 
[kanal-spoat]. I speak as the person responsible for the struggle. I am not talking about 
myself.
Just now I wanted to know if there is still a possibility, and better yet, in fact, ways 
for us to end this situation. If there are not, then—I can say—we [the resistance] will 
carry on to the death. That is the only way Indonesia will end this war. Frankly, at 
present we are capable of continuing the war. Our fighters have a more offensive spirit 
\jiwa ofensif], better technical abilities—I don't mean better than the Commando 
troops36—but better in the circumstances [konsensus] of this war. Elements who never 
received any basic training, now have, thanks to our endeavors, the minimal 
qualifications for us to continue the war. We are certain of this, because we know that 
the war will not end, but we also know that continuing the war will result in the 
sacrifice of even more of our people. As for the settlements that we attacked, we can 
explain that we did not intend to set them ablaze because we like to set [houses] 
ablaze. In 1979 we strenuously opposed the destruction of people's property. But the
36 "Pasukan Komando" refers to the Secret Warfare Command (Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha 
(abbreviated "Kopassandha"). In 1986, three years after the meeting between Gusmao and Carrascalao, 
Kopassandha was renamed Komando Pasukan Khusus (Kopassus).
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politics of resettlement37 meant death and forced us to take action. This was what 
guaranteed that we could continue the war up to the present.
Because of all this, I took the initiative to send a letter to you, thinking that it was 
our responsibility to share our ideas, to see what might happen or whether there were 
any guarantees of a good resolution of the situation, and if so we would move forward. 
That was not our attitude towards previous Governors, for example Guilherme 
Gonsalves.381 know them [the Apodeti people] well. I have a different view of you. I 
told my boys: He [Mario Carrascalao] is someone who is of value to our homeland and 
people.39 If we reach a common vision, that is, a desire to resolve this situation in a 
good way, then this can be used as a bridge to cross into new territory. That was my 
position even before I met with Mayor Gatot and the others.40 At times when they [my 
boys] were afraid, I told them: If you are afraid to take this letter to him [Governor 
Carrascalao], just put the letter in the mail [p. 10]. So even though there are people who 
say that these meetings have taken place on their initiative, I can say that I was already 
leaning in that direction. But the difficulty of communication prevented [us from] 
achieving the desired aim.
So, believe me, Senhor Mario, we [the resistance] have no aim other than the one 
we have stated. We are conscious of realities, we are aware of our mistakes (I myself 
have often made mistakes).
So, if we continue to be stubborn—like wood against stones—we will never achieve 
anything.41
Governor: Yes, right. But what about the practicalities?
Xanana: It's like this: Senhor Mdrio's presentation seems to offer a very gloomy 
picture in every respect. Perhaps I can put it this way. If we coordinate our efforts, at 
some point we will say: We have the power in our own land, meaning that our people 
are sovereign. As for the minimal conditions that Senhor Mario touched on, it is as 
though our people are not conscious of what they want. I want to problematize this: If 
the people have supported us [the resistance] all this time, that means that the people 
know what they want. During [the meeting] at Larigutu421 said that we are of no use if 
we do not give substance to the people's desires. At the very least, as is the case in
37 The translation provides both the Portuguese and Indonesian terms: "repovoasi/ pemukiman- 
pemukiman." In the desperate circumstances after the fall of the last base areas in the eastern sector, 
Fretilin/Falintil resorted to direct attacks on Indonesia's "resettlement" camps.
38 Guilherme Gongalves, the liurai (little king) of Atsabe, was a founding member of Apodeti. Fie served as 
governor from 1978 until 1982.
39 The transcription uses the Indonesian term "tanah air" (land and water); Gusmao presumably used the 
Portuguese word "Patria."
40 A series of low-level meetings between Indonesian officers and Fretilin/Falintil commanders eventually 
led to meetings between Major Gatot and Xanana Gusmao. See the East Timor Commission for Reception, 
Truth, and Reconciliation's final report, Chega!, for a partial chronology.
41 The original says: "Makanya, kalau kita tetap keras kepala, kayu! kayu! dan batu-batu maka kita tidak 
akan menyelesaikan sesuatu."
42 The meeting on March 23,1983, at which ABRI and Fretilin agreed to the temporary ceasefire.
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other parts of the world, [our] guerrilla [fighters] would not be able to survive [without 
the support of the people]. So I can say that our people do know what they want. For 
those of us responsible43 for the people, it is our duty to direct the people so that they 
develop an awareness of what they want and how to achieve those aspirations.
It will be difficult to find a way for us to say:44 "Alright! Whether they accept it or 
not, I have no intention to get involved in these tangled intrigues.["] But in the present 
conditions of war, we must address these difficulties. My letter also explains that a 
person's abilities will not go unrecognized. Those of us here in the jungle are aware of 
this principle. Furthermore, as the leader of the struggle I have told my boys that after 
the war the problems we will face will be even more difficult. "Don't think that after 
the war is over everything will be easy and we can sit back and relax. No!["]
The problem of National reconstruction is very complex [komplet, sic]. Senhor Mdrio 
Carrascalao has just touched on the minimum conditions. If [by mentioning] these 
minimal conditions you mean to imply our lack of technical and technological ability 
and, moreover, our economic incapacity, alright, I agree that in the short-term we will 
not be able to develop our territory. With Indonesia or within Indonesia, it also won't 
be easy considering the population of 150 million. As Almeida Santos put it, [Indonesia 
is like] "a Transatlantic [liner] that has broken down in mid-ocean."451 think there are 
minimal conditions for developing our territory without reducing the honor of our 
people, which make me proud. I think Senhor Mario is also proud to be a son of this 
people. As Senhor Mario just said, there are students of ours who do not want to 
return to East Timor because they want [to live] somewhere better. I was in Australia, 
where I worked as a manual laborer [p. 11]. I was one of the semi-employed. Every day 
we read in the papers about the rising unemployment rate. So if there was a call or 
announcement for laborers and only a few people were needed, thousands of people 
would come to apply. So I imagine how those [Timorese] who leave will be able to live 
there [abroad], I am afraid of dozing off at this stage [of the struggle], when we need to 
be preparing the conditions for giving substance to our Independence, bearing in mind 
that we are a small, poor, and backward people.
I think the people of East Timor will be put in the hands of those who are most 
able, that is, those who are willing to give, those who say: "That which is mine I give to 
the people." That will guarantee our values and identity. I am prepared to work as best 
I can. Concerning National Unity, don't misunderstand this idea, or accept the 
distortions circulated by bapak-bapak [the Indonesian military].46 "Fretilin is deceiving 
you. They will throw you all in jail." National Unity is not intended as a "Maneuver" 
by one [group] against another. National Unity is [a way] for us to prepare for the 
circumstances that will arise. Because in East Timor, in order for us to realize our
43 The Indonesian transcript uses the word "penanggung-jawab," presumably where Gusmao used the 
Fretilin-term "responsivel."
44 The placement of the quotation marks is problematic. Rather than following the highly questionable 
punctuation in the Indonesian language, whereby there is a single long quote, it is far more likely that 
Gusmao intended for only the first and last sentences to be what he said to his troops.
45 In the Indonesian transcript, this is part of the previous sentence. Gusmao likely intended this to be a 
separate sentence. The quotation reads: "sebuah Transatlantik yang macet didalam lautan."
46 Throughout the text, both Carrascalao and Gusmao use the Indonesian "bapak-bapak" to refer to the 
Indonesian military (ABRI).
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identity as a nation, we need to adjust to the circumstances that will arise and not be 
limited by the thinking that accumulated before those conditions arose. I am a Marxist. 
When I speak with Father Locatelli, I say this: "Father, I don't want to lie to anyone. I 
profess an ideology, I am a Marxist but I know what has to be done in East Timor. Just 
as you, Father [Locatelli], left your family to come here to help this people, the same [is 
true of] my ideology. I fight to lessen the suffering of the people, but I know that my 
ideology will not be accepted here, and I will not plant seeds that are not appropriate 
to this land." It would not be realistic—or as Senhor [Carrascalao] said, it would be to 
behave like sheep47—were I to force myself, to impose my ideology on everyone else.
In this regard, I do not want to act simply because of our needs, and I do not accept 
the way of acting that Senhor Mario has suggested, because in our bodies flows a blood 
that forces us to become what in reality we must be. As for language, I can say that I 
only know Portuguese—it isn't that I reject other languages—but yes! I have studied 
Portuguese and local languages, although I am not a polyglot who has mastered many 
languages.
What I know is that because of this situation, Indonesian—of which I once knew a 
little—makes my mouth hurt. So when Senhor Gonsalves told Jose Conceigao48 that 
many [Indonesian-language] schools have been opened, I asked where I [at age 37] 
could go to learn bahasa.491 can't swallow it.
I was somewhat disappointed when I heard Dr. Gonga Ives's statement that [the 
ceasefire] negotiations are not important. We must treat these negotiations as a process 
that is long, complex, and difficult.
So we need to be in contact with people who enlighten us, people who can help us 
so that we achieve a satisfactory outcome [p. 12]. Attitudes such as those of Dr.
Gongalves make me think: How do these people view ...........?50 That's why I wrote to
you saying: "If you want to listen to me, fine! If you don't, no problem.["] I plead that 
our position not be treated as an attempted maneuver, because I know a bit about what 
people are thinking.
Governor: This situation must be addressed seriously because Indonesia wants to 
legalize Timor Timur as a province. Of course this will lead to a number of changes, 
and I am certain the Government will not overlook these.
Timor Timur is a Province of Indonesia based on a decision by the highest 
Legislative Body, which is the MPR. It is also essential to be aware that if possible [sic, 
necessary] Indonesia will withdraw from the United Nations in order to maintain its 
rights over Timor Timur. The Timor Timur process [of integration], which at first was 
only the business of the government of Indonesia, is now understood by the entire
47 Earlier in the discussion, Carrascalao used the phrase "like sheep" (bertindak seperti biri-biri).
48 lose da Conceigao survived the 1978 assault on Mount Matebian and then found refuge in Lautem 
District, at the eastern tip of the island. In early 1983, he was the first Falintil commander contacted by 
ABRI officers.
49 "Bahasa" refers to the Indonesian language.
50 The end of the sentence is not legible. It may have been erased or written over. The first letter may he 
“p" and a final "i" is visible, suggesting that it says "proses ini," or "this process."
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population of Indonesia, which feels that the best road for the people of Timor Timur is 
integration with Indonesia. If there were to emerge rogue elements [oknum-oknum] who 
sought to change the Indonesian Government's consensus on Timor Timur, achieving 
that goal would be out of the question because it would be the same as killing off the 
MPR, which is the People's Consultative [Assembly], Quite frankly, internally [within 
Indonesia] the problem of Timor Timur is already resolved, but in the external arena 
Indonesia is still carrying out diplomatic efforts so that there, too, the problem can also 
be laid to rest.
So, I think that the Timor Timur problem is like other cases that can occur in 
history, either because of our own acts or because of what others did. Take the case of 
Portugal as an example. Portugal, a small country with a small population and a feeble 
economy, succeeded in maintaining its rule over various [Overseas] Provinces for such 
a long time. If there hadn't been a domestic rebellion, there is no certainty that the 
[Overseas] Provinces would have obtained independence. Although the liberation 
movements in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau had all sorts of facilities, such 
as bases in neighboring countries, they were not always successful.
Now let's look at the problem of Timor Timur, where there isn't an [operational] 
base that can't be reached by enemy attacks.
Is it possible to avoid the black scenario that I described?
Can the armed struggle avoid the black scenario that I spoke of in my [opening] 
presentation?
At one point in New York, I asked Mari Alkatiri the following question: "Have you 
prepared backup weapons to support the people on the front lines?["]
Mari Alkatiri responded: ["]The Government of Mozambique has already provided 
a ship and Vietnam has given weapons left over by the American military. But we 
haven't found a way to unload the ship in East Timor.["] Then I asked: ["]So are you 
going to wait until you run out of facilities [weapons], and only then report this to the 
United Nations?["]
Mari Alkatiri gave the same answer as [you], Gusmao: "We will hold out with 
weapons from the enemy" [p. 13]. Then I responded: ["]Alright! Don't forget this. 
Strategy is determined by both parties to the conflict. In warfare, intelligence plays a
role, it doesn't cease. For me, waging war under these conditions...........I don't mean
that you have already been defeated. The real defeat should have happened in 1976 or 
1977. In fact, I respect you because you have been able to make sacrifices to a point that 
was unimaginable. But based on the conditions I just explained, Timor Timur is 
recognized as a Province of Indonesia and all sorts of laws will be passed. And I am 
certain that the current "status quo" will be overcome, but rogues will emerge who 
want the "status quo" to be maintained.51
Militarily, recalling that the minimum required conditions are not present, open 
warfare will not bring victory, particularly when you recall that the minimum
51 The transcript uses the spelling "status Guo." Here, Carrascalao seems to be referring to the possibility 
that factions within the Indonesian military would seek to continue the conflict either to justify the 
military's political position or as a useful testing ground for officers seeking promotion.
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conditions are not present. In light of the geographic conditions and situation of Timor 
Timur, I think there is no point for all of you to sacrifice your lives, because under 
these conditions I can't imagine how long all of you will be able to hold out, but I don't 
yet know what your military conditions are.
I also see that the conditions of the Indonesian consolidation here [mean that] 
children study the Indonesian language in school. Every day they more and more feel 
that they are Indonesian citizens. In these conditions it will be more difficult for all of 
you to receive the help and support that you currently receive to carry out a long-term 
struggle, but that won't last forever.52
Because of that, I want to say that exercise of our brains [olahraga mental] will be 
required in order to find a practical solution. By that I mean a way to achieve an 
appropriate outcome, an outcome that is not mistaken. Of course, for all of you who 
have struggled for eight years in the forest it is [probably] rather difficult to accept 
opinions like this. I just hope that the situation does not become even worse, though 
from another angle I can also say that the people in the Timor Timur [Military] 
Command53 are magnanimous [berjiwa besar], they have a more rational attitude.54 
Furthermore, I simply hope that the situation in the future is not painted in black and 
white, and I also hope that I will not be accused of being one of the people responsible 
for that imagined scenario. You must understand that your struggle is isolated. Some 
time ago the Indonesian media still mentioned the Timor Timur problem. Not 
anymore, and you need to know that there is now greater press freedom in Indonesia 
than there once was. Based on conversations I've had with a number of people, I've 
come to the conclusion that in practical terms these people are not even aware of the 
resistance in Timor Timur, unless [of course] the son of a big-shot or an officer is killed 
in combat. In light of the black picture I've described, you must always bear this in 
mind so that further approaches can be more productive.
Sometimes a war can be won or lost because of historical accidents. For example, 
the Portuguese Colonies in Africa or the initial defeat experienced by the liberation 
movement in Ethiopia. If Cuban troops had not come to help, the liberation movement 
in Ethiopia would surely have suffered total defeat [p. 14].
I touch on this in order to remind you that a war can end in defeat because of small 
accidents. More fortunate were the forces in Belize,55 who, without great sacrifices, 
achieved Independence because the diplomatic conflict over that country by 
Guatemala and England created the necessary conditions. Even though Guatemala 
continued to have diplomatic control over Belize, in relative terms the people of Belize
52 This sentence is vague and includes the word "bln," presumably a typographical error of the word 
"bukan," meaning "not."
53 From early 1976 until late 1978, Indonesian military operations in East Timor were conducted by the 
Regional Defense and Security Command (Komando Daerah Pertahanan Keamanan, abbreviated 
Kodahankam). In late 1978, Kodahankam was abolished and replaced by a new Security Operations 
Command (Komando Operasi Keamanan, abbreviated Koopskam).
54 Carrascalao presumably is referring to the replacement of the brutal Sub-Regional Military Commander 
Adolf Sahala Radjagukguk, who served from March 26,1979 to sometime in 1982 and who had been 
directly responsible for the implementation of the "fence-of-legs" operation in 1981.
55 The transcript says Bolivia, which is clearly incorrect. Carrascalao is referring to Belize, which obtained 
independence from Great Britain in 1981. Following independence, 1,500 British troops defended Belize 
from Guatemalan aggression.
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felt that they were free; and, of course, the future of Belize will always depend on 
Guatemalan policy. I know another story. The Prime Minister of the Dominican 
Republican once showed up at the UN. The appearance of a Prime Minister at the UN 
is usually occasion for all sorts of strange and mocking stories. That Prime Minister 
failed in his role, and in a speech he ... [narrative is interrupted when tape runs out] ...
[Cassette II, Side A]
Governor: I think it would be good for someone trustworthy [from the resistance] 
to come to Jakarta to explain directly to the Indonesian Government what you all want. 
I cannot fill that role, not because I think of myself as a militant or a victor in war (I do 
not consider myself to be a victor in this war), but because if I am given the task of 
intermediary I always want to give perfect expression to what one party has to say to 
the other party. As evidence, I can tell you that private parties56 once asked me not to 
tell Government elements about less laudable aspects of the situation in Timor Timur. 
Of course, I did not fulfill those requests because in principle I am not someone who 
plays those kinds of games. Even so, if I were entrusted to forward what you all want 
to the Jakarta government, I would carry out that task to the best of my ability.
Returning to the international chessboard,57 don't hope that Portugal will do much 
about the case of East Timor. I am reminded of the repatriation process to Portugal for 
East Timorese who wanted to be Portuguese citizens. While the repatriation process 
was being carried out, the Portuguese Ambassador in New York said to me: "Senhor, 
don't get involved, it's the Government's political problem. If you want to bring 
Ramos-Horta's mother to Portugal, you must be very careful."58 I can also say that 
most of the information conveyed by the Indonesian delegation to the UN came from 
Portuguese diplomats. Don't hope for anything from the Portuguese. Believe me!
During the rule of Sd Carneiro59 (of the Social Democratic Party) a tragedy almost 
occurred, that is, Portugal [almost] acknowledged the Integration of Timor Timur into 
the Republic of Indonesia. With Sa Carneiro's death, the candidate from the Social 
Democratic Party, Soares Carneiro, failed to defeat his rival, Ramalho Eanes [p. 15]. If 
Sa Carneiro hadn't died and [Soares Carneiro] had been elected President, Portugal 
would most certainly have recognized the integration of Timor Timur into Indonesia. 
In fact, during discussions about the East Timor problem at the time, the Social 
Democratic Party received support from the majority in Parliament, but because 
Ramalho Eanes as President did not support the Social Democratic Party's proposal, 
things that would have benefited Indonesia were not discussed. The Socialist Party is 
now in power.
56 The transcript reads "pihak-pihak partikuler."
57 The transcript uses the grammatically incorrect "penyaturan," conveying a sense of both a chess board 
and intrigues.
58 The meaning is not clear, though it is worth noting that Mario Carrascalao's younger brother Joao 
Carrasacalao was married to one of Jose Ramos-Horta's sisters.
59 Francisco Sa Carneiro was a member of the misleadingly named Social Democratic Party that, founded 
after the April 1974 Carnation Revolution, represented liberal elements within the Salazar-Caetano regime. 
Sa Carneiro died in an airplane crash.
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When this Party was still in opposition, it did in fact try to approach groups that 
supported Fretilin. But what did the Socialist Party do? The top figure was not Mario 
Soares, but Almeida Santos, who had tremendous influence within the Socialist Party. 
Once in power, the Socialist Party was more Pro-West, that is more Pro-American, than 
Pro-East.60 The same was the case in France, [where] Miterrand from the Conservative 
Party [sic] was friendlier with the Soviet Union than was Giscard d'Estaing, who was a 
socialist.61
Under Mdrio Soares, Portugal will be the same. The Portuguese economy is in dire 
straits, and those who can reach out to help Portugal are the United States and perhaps 
also Germany and France. Whatever aid Portugal receives will come with strings. And 
finally, there are unreliable elements in the Socialist Party led by Mdrio Soares. 
Portugal will do [even] less than previous governments regarding East Timor. 
Furthermore, it is also important to note this: it was Portugal that originally took the 
East Timor problem to the UN. At the time the East Timor problem was brought up in 
the UN, the Portuguese Government [headed by General Eanes] took more "leftist" 
positions than later [civilian] governments. However, when [Eanes's] Government was 
asked to sign the Resolution prepared by Fretilin and several countries that supported 
it, Portugal always refused and gave the reason/excuse [alasan] that Portugal should 
take a neutral position so that it would be free to intervene when need be. Of course 
Fretilin's elements outside62 did not accept that reason/excuse. Promise after promise, 
but in fact none was kept. The one Government that did something in accordance with 
Fretilin's views was the Government that fell last year. That Government sent 
representatives to thirty-eight Countries, if I'm not mistaken, to seek their support in 
the UN General Session in October 1982.
But one must understand that East Timor is not really important to the Portuguese 
Government. At the time the Social Democratic Party was losing support [kewibawaan, 
literally "authority"] in Parliament and there were serious threats to its rule. So in 
order to regain popular sympathy, the Party increased its support for East Timor. Even 
so, perhaps because this took place too late, the Social Democratic Party was still 
defeated by Mario Soares. On the flip side, Mdrio Soares did not depend on the East 
Timor problem to win the General Election. For that reason, in my analysis, Mario 
Soares, who is now in power in Portugal, will try with all his strength to achieve 
political stability in his country without paying too much attention to the East Timor 
question. For many Portuguese people I contacted in New York, the East Timor 
problem is only manipulated by politicians to obtain votes. That is our fate, that is East 
Timor's fate [p. 16].
If there are African countries that still support the resolution put forward by 
Fretilin (perhaps they support Fretilin because they have shared principles), that is 
because of respect for colonial borders[.] As we know, Africans were colonized by 
England, Belgium, France, Portugal, and others. Before they were colonized, they were
60 Or "Pro Timur," meaning pro-communist.
61 The political positions depicted here are reversed: whereas the conservative Giscard d'Estaing engaged 
Moscow, his successor, Frangois Mitterand, of the Socialist Party, was on far more cordial terms with 
Germany than with the USSR.
62 Carrascalao is referring to the Fretilin External Delegation, but by using the plural he is highlighting the 
fact that there were serious internal divisions within this delegation.
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a united nation. Nah! Now each of them is Independent because they were separated 
by the colonizers. So if these African nations recognize the Integration of Timor Timur 
within Indonesia, that opens the possibility that one day they will demand the 
integration of those that are weaker, so that their unity, which was lost because of the 
colonizers, can be regained. For them, the background to supporting and demanding 
Decolonization is respect for Colonial boundaries. But there are differences between 
the countries in West Africa and the countries in East Africa. The countries in West 
Africa—including Ivory Coast, Gabon, Ghana, Senegal, Morocco, Guinea-Conakry— 
which are wealthy and have better defensive integrity, have not taken a strong stand 
on the East Timor problem. That's why many of them don't need to cast votes in 
debates about the case of East Timor. The case of Cameroon is pretty strange too. That 
country always abstains [in UN votes] about East Timor because internally the people 
are not united, and that is because the country arose out of the merger of two former 
colonies—one colonized by England and the other colonized by France. Of course, the 
Government of Cameroon always promotes its efforts to unite the population within a 
new consensus. But on the other hand, Nigeria demands the return of its people who 
now live in Cameroon and are considered to be citizens of Cameroon. Under these 
circumstances, Cameroon cannot take a stand on the East Timor case.
By going through my analysis, I want to give you a realistic picture of the 
international chessboard. The promises made by countries are only useful as material 
for daily interactions. Their real positions come into view when they press the buttons 
in the [UN] sessions: the red button means opposed and the green button means in 
favor. At that moment their real wishes become known. Other than that, everything is 
just rhetoric.63 When Indonesia nominated itself to become a member of EKOSOK64
(Economic, Social, ...........), an international body in the field of Coordinating
Economic, Social, and other [issues], it was Portugal that provided support. That same 
year, when Portugal nominated itself to become a member of the Security Council, 
support from Asian countries was obtained via Indonesia. In New York, I often said to 
Indonesian diplomats that I am not a good person for this kind of work. "You all can 
[do this] because you have been educated for this profession. But me, ahh! It is difficult 
for me to adjust to this work because I was educated in a more positive discipline, 
where white must be white and black must be black." That's what I told them. As a 
silviculturalist (agriculture and forestry engineer), I am not cut out for this sort of 
work. For me taking care of plants and trees is an art, and if a tree does not grow 
perhaps it needs more fertilizer or something. But to deal with people who laugh in 
front of us but then when they are behind us have no qualms about killing us, that 
kind of work is incompatible with my character [p. 17]. So at the UN each country just 
struggles for its own interests, sometimes by sacrificing the interests of the small 
nations. That is my brief analysis of problems in international politics.
I am an Absolute Partisan [Partidaris Obsolut] of those who seek something better 
for East Timor! Absolute! I say this everywhere and to anyone. I support with the 
necessary sacrifice [any] efforts that aim for something better for East Timor.
63 The transcript says: "pembuka kata apt dari mata." This may be a typographical mistake, meant to translate 
"taking off one's glasses," or a clumsy literal translation of a Portuguese proverb that the Portuguese-to- 
Indonesian translator did not understand.
64 EKOSOK is the United Nations Economic and Social Council.
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I hold this principle because I am a Technocrat. A politician would not speak the 
way I do. Really and truly, I am opposed to anything that smells of politics, anything 
that is not practical. As for the political parties in Indonesia, I don't take sides, except 
for Golkar because it is not a party.65
Xanana: Your last intervention includes several points that I can accept because 
they are intended to elucidate. But there are other aspects of your intervention that 
require clarification.
Governor: Of course! Of course!
Xanana: As far as hoping for outside intervention, I need to explain that at present 
we are not too worried about whether or not foreign assistance will arrive. At the 
beginning of this, because of a lack of experience, we did always think about the 
possibility or hope of foreign assistance. The first contact [experience] with the 
situation of war led to thinking that was not objective (it is not necessary to touch on 
the coup d'etat carried out by UDT—that was simply about killing each other66). After 
we had come to terms with the reality, which differed from our earlier thinking, we 
eventually came to be oriented by the principle "count on our own strengths."67 For us 
it is [most] appropriate to see the situation as it is and to act in accordance. So, it is 
neither [what happens] today nor what happens tomorrow that will make us lose 
authority ....
Governor: Of course! But Senhor Gusmao, please listen. Perhaps—I say perhaps— 
you all can take advantage of the present atmosphere and make an effort to find out 
through direct observation, whatever it takes, to understand from up close the 
structures in Indonesia so that you all can take a more appropriate stance towards 
Indonesia.
Also, with the opportunity opened by the local Government, you should (if 
possible, I don't know if this is possible) try to contact some of the people so that you 
all know what they think about the current situation. Not just with one or two people, 
not just with Dr. Gongalves. Because there is something you need to see: For example, I 
am a person who will say what I think even if I am in front of a tape recorder. But there 
are others who are startled when they are in front of a tape recorder [p. 18]. When 
faced with a tape recorder, they are insufficiently flexible in discussing their problems. 
Because of that they are not well prepared to consider matters that need to be
65 In 1967, the Indonesian military declared that its corporatist umbrella and electoral vehicle, Golongan 
Karya (Golkar), was not a political party, thus circumventing its own ban on political activity at the
grassroots level.
66 On August 11,1975, the Timorese Democratic Union (Uniao Democratica Timorense) seized power in 
Dili. This was led by Mario Carrascalao's younger brother, Joao Carrascalao. A week after the UDT coup, 
Fretilin counterattacked and eventually forced UDT leaders to flee across the border into Indonesian West
Timor.
67 Gusmao presumably used Fretilin's Tetum slogan "ukun rasik an.”
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considered. To take advantage of the current situation and recalling the difficult 
communications you all face, I think that all of you can obtain concrete data that can 
form the basis for more appropriate considerations concerning the problem.
As for the support that you just mentioned, I admit that there is [such support].68 
There have in fact been several cases related to that. But the people who support you 
have ways of behaving that are at cross purposes. Some are prepared to take risks but 
others not, and yet I think they are working for the same goal. Usually those who talk 
the loudest are those who want to leave Timor Timur as fast as possible. They are 
useless. One person who used to be pretty trustworthy was Domingos de Oliveira.69 
But he left Timor Timur and now works in Australia. It wouldn't be a bad thing for 
you all to contact people who have influence so that you can find out what Indonesia is 
now and also what Indonesia will become in the future. You should contact lots of 
people so that you can form a concrete picture of Indonesia. I once spoke to an 
influential Muslim. He said that their goal was to form an Islamic Government [of 
Indonesia]. I told him that if they achieved their goal Indonesia would disintegrate. He 
responded as follows: "That's our goal. If the others join, okay! If you all don't want to 
join then form your own Government."
I have also spoken with several of the people involved in the movement that tried 
to do something on June 10, 1980,70 which resulted in some of them being detained and 
some murdered. But that was because they were influenced by others; they didn't 
think with "cool heads" and so the conclusions they reached were immature. Others 
among them have been fired from their jobs. Speaking of people from other islands [in 
Indonesia], plenty among them also have aspirations [of separatism]. But they have 
their own aspirations. Some of them even said: "While we are on our way out, you 
guys [the East Timorese] are intent on getting in." I told them: "Ha, you are leaving 
like sheep!"
It is clear that there is still a little armed resistance in Irian Jaya; Armed struggle! 
But they will be wiped off the map. And yet they have conditions that don't exist in 
Timor Timur, which is to say that they have Papua New Guinea behind them[.] Each 
time a [foreign] Government approaches Indonesia, this always results in a bilateral 
agreement, and so the people in Irian Jaya will suffer. I just went to Jakarta; I told the 
government, "I met the Fretilin leader." At the time I went to the Minister of Internal 
Affairs.71 After reporting to him about this, he said excitedly, "That means there's 
progress! And we'll resolve this problem in an integral way, so that what happened in 
Irian Jaya doesn't happen again" [p. 19]. I don't know what he means by "in an 
integral way."721 have also focused on this with the Minister of Foreign Affairs,73 but
68 It is not clear whether Carrascalao means foreign support for the resistance or Gusmao's appeal for 
"national unity" (i.e., Governor Mario Carrascalao doing what he can to assist the struggle against 
Indonesian rule).
69 Domingos de Oliveira was a founding member of UDT. He left East Timor in the late 1970s.
70 On June 10,1980, Fretilin/ Falintil staged a daring attack on Indonesian military facilities on the outskirts 
of Dili. For the history of this attack, see CAVR, Chega! Final Report o f the East Timor Commission for  
Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation.
71 The Minister of Internal Affairs was Lieutenant General Soepardjo Rustam.
72 In Indonesian political thinking, the idea of an "integralistic" state originated with Supomo during 
constitutional debates in 1945. In this context, "integral" means "among ourselves."
73 The Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs was Mochtar Kusumaatmadja.
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he said: ["]That problem is no longer important because it has been settled at the 
International level.["] So I said...........
Xanana: Senhor Mario Carrascalao, I never said that when I had the idea of 
contacts [between the resistance and the Indonesian military] I thought that this would 
be ongoing. I can tell you now that my views at the time still apply...........
Governor: I understand your analysis
Xanana: I will try harder to understand what you have explained. I can't say now 
what the result will be. As for your idea, I'll make efforts to contact more people. 
Contacts are also a difficult issue. One thing I want to highlight is that our contacts 
should be carried out in a freer atmosphere. I have indeed brought armed elements 
with me, but there are no bad intentions or aims behind that. We can now speak with 
the Army that we once killed and that killed us, and moreover [speak] with Senhor 
[Carrascalao] who we also consider to be a Son of this land. What would we achieve by 
torturing or killing you?
"If I bring troops, that's because, yes, that's the way it is! What's clear is that if I 
have the ability to fight I also have the ability to engage in dialogue"—that's what I 
said to my troops who were initially nervous. If you want to meet with us, all you have 
to do is get in a helicopter, but we have to walk for kilometers. The weapons I carry are 
not a threat.
Governor: Oh! No! I'm prepared to speak anywhere at all. If you all want to 
propose something, I won't have objections and, moreover, I will not place any 
conditions on the desired meetings. Never!! It just so happens that today Pastor 
Locatelli asked me to present diplomas to the kids in the Fatumaka [seminary], and it 
also just so happens that there was this opportunity. As for security conditions ... I am 
one who fully believes that we only die once.
Xanana: The other thing I want to bring up concerns the others—what I mean by 
others are our clandestine members. We don't have a problem because we can retreat 
into the forest and ... we're safe! What I'm worried about is what might happen to 
them (meaning the clandestine members!) as a consequence ... whatever good 
intentions they [the Indonesian military] may have ... (?). This is what we're afraid of
Governor: No! Look! I can guarantee that as far as I know there are no
preparations for what you refer to.
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Xanana: Concerning that ... I suggest that contacts (meaning clandestine members) 
not be used again, because two of the people we sent as emissaries have said things 
that are inappropriate ... like the example Senhor Mario gave earlier about "when 
facing a tape recorder they lose control" and so on [p. 20],
Governor: One more example: several days ago someone came to my office and 
suggested that I cancel this meeting with you. I responded, nothing special is going on 
and then I asked how did he hear about this (because I never told anyone about our 
meeting).
The person said: ["]Ah! We know that in several [days] bapak [Carrascalao] will 
meet with Xanana. But we suggest that you shouldn't go ..."
There are also a number of people in Dili who are on guard, they think the reason I 
haven't invited you to come down [to Dili] is that I am [secretly] giving you some hope 
.... They won't even speak with me now. But my principle is that I will not influence 
others to make decisions about their own fate because each person is responsible for 
himself. And I say what I think.
Xanana: Right! Right!
Governor: I'm someone who wants to sleep well at night. I don't want surprises. I 
want to work in peace, and I want to relax in peace. I don't want psychological 
problems to bother me. And there are some who say: "So ..., if they [Fretilin] want to 
talk, why don't they come here?"
Xanana: Yes! We would also think that way. Some say: "If the Governor comes to 
the forest and is safe, why doesn't Senhor Xanana come here?" But they don't see the 
conditions of war.
Governor: But I guarantee [your safety]. If you want to come to Dili some day, 
come!
Xanana: The problem isn't that I need witnesses. But there's no psychological 
advantage for me.
Governor: I can arrange so that secrecy is kept. For example: when Jos£ Conceigao 
came to Dili to deliver your letter to me, no one knew. The first anyone knew of it was 
the next day when I gave him my letter for you. But the person who learned of it was 
only my driver, and that was because I wasn't prepared to prevent it. But I can say 
that, in general, people's reactions to our meetings has been very positive, even though 
this has been expressed in various ways. Some consider these approaches to be a
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starting point of a calmer life—and they might be the majority; some say, "You know, 
we're all Timorese, so why should one have to surrender to the other?"; and there are 
others who, perhaps thinking far ahead, view this process as the "End of Fretilin." But 
in general, the population has a positive view of this process and there are also those 
who remain silent but have something that can be considered as starting capital [modal 
dasar] for the future.
Xanana: For us, we're willing to continue this process [p. 21].
Governor: Okay. But I hope that nothing will happen like what happened in 
Lospalos.
More than anything, I don't want this to be psychologically difficult for people, 
because in these circumstances there are rogue elements [oknum-oknum] who 
unconsciously spread threats by saying: "Now that we've won the war, whoever 
refuses to obey us will be punished [diadili]." That's why the people of Lospalos are 
always confused and suffer. It is well known that Lospalos is an area that has suffered 
the most. Because of the situation before this [ceasefire] process, some people have 
been transferred, some have been punished, and so forth because they support Fretilin. 
When I visited Atauro [island], I once spoke with an old person who was there because 
she/he had given food to his/her son who was in the forest. This is a real case. But 
there are also cases in which the background is a desire to steal property from others. 
This usually happens in unstable situations like Lospalos now. But believe me, by the 
end of this year there will be no more prisoners still on Atauro.
Xanana: I can guarantee that we will not cause problems in the future, but recently 
we've heard threats against us. We are prepared to find a solution, and we are also 
prepared for this [ceasefire] process not to continue indefinitely. But you also need to 
realize that unwanted things have happened in some places because we didn't have 
the technical ability to prevent them; the problem is that communication among 
ourselves [the resistance] is not guaranteed. That's why we request that Senhor Mario 
suggest to bapak-bapak [ABRI] a cessation [of activities].
Governor: As far as I know, the Sub-Regional Military Commander has ordered 
his troops to retreat from areas where you are. The Commander adopted this policy in 
order to guarantee that the contacts can take place smoothly...........
Xanana: In one sense, one can say that is true, but in another sense it is not true. As 
you know, we live off the land. Support from the people isn't logistical support. The 
places we camp are based on the seasons. For example, where kombili (a wild tuber) 
grows, that is where we go, where koang (another kind of wild tuber) grows, that is 
where we camp at a certain time. But recently it seems that they [ABRI] are trying to 
prevent our survival. This might force us to take action to guarantee our own survival.
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Governor: The [Military] Command has withdrawn troops so that those people 
who are still in the forests are not reluctant to make contact with people living in 
settlements.
Xanana: We appeal for National Unity in order to achieve independence, with the 
proviso that in the future we will oppose all those who seek revenge. That is the real 
direction of our efforts. But recently the enemy has sent instructions to the regions that 
state: "If they [Fretilin] come, they are to be arrested and their weapons are to be seized
and ..........." We really want to add perspectives in order to reach a good
understanding...........[text cut off at bottom of page 22].
Finally, we decided that contact with the settlements should be reduced. Because 
we don't have much control over what happens, sometimes things happen that are not 
based on our initiatives. On the one hand, we are trying to increase mutual 
understanding, but on the other hand they [ABRI] are preventing it. If things like that 
happen and armed confrontations occur, we're afraid that we will be accused [of 
instigating it]. Our aim is to negotiate ... as Senhor Mario wrote, "it would be a mistake 
to view Indonesia's position as one of weakness[.]" And we say: It is a mistake to view 
our position as one of weakness.
Governor: What I meant earlier wasn't intended to be deprecating, but incorrect 
definitions like that can cause new conflicts. I wrote that to (?) because at the time he 
(?) had raised several questions. If I knew where he was, of course, I would have taken 
a different position, and I might have tried to contact him (?).74 Bu t...........
Xanana: Let's try to avoid too many contacts. Everywhere, everyone wants to take 
photographs and...........
[the end]
74 The identity of this person is not known.
